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Abstract: By comparing Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) and Baudrillard through the lens of a study of the 
notion of withdrawal in Heidegger’s tool analysis and “The Question Concerning Technology”, this article 
explores the extent to which an Object-Oriented Baudrillard is possible, or even necessary. Considering an 
OOO understanding of Mauss’s gift-exchange, a possible critique of duomining in Baudrillard and a revision 
of Baudrillard’s understanding of art, the prospects of a new reading of Baudrillard and interpretation of 
OOO’s genealogy are established. These lines of comparison qualify the role of withdrawal in Baudrillard 
and symbolic exchange for OOO, and lead towards the conclusion that an Object-Oriented Baudrillard is 
possible, but may not, conversely, be considered necessary. 
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Is there a certain degree of congruence between Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) and Baudrillard, and 
how might one communicate and exchange with the other? This enquiry seeks to answer this question 
by addressing the ways in which anticipatory traces of Baudrillard’s philosophy can be discovered in the 
work of Martin Heidegger, particularly in his tool analysis and The Question Concerning Technology, both 
being significant pieces for the development of Object-Oriented theory. Such an analysis will highlight the 
critical theme of “withdrawal” central to OOO’s thought and the value in the discussion of the technological 
in its broadest sense. Yet, conversely, it will not mean that the function of withdrawal will be assumed 
as identical in each. Rather, this shall be put under close scrutiny to advance a clearer understanding of 
all three. As much attention has previously been given to the relationship between OOO and Heidegger, 
the article will initially focus only on the relationship between Baudrillard and Heidegger, and how this 
account elucidates significant dimensions of Object-Oriented thought in a new way. In particular, this will 
pay close attention to the possibility of knowing an object and the role and character of gift-exchange in 
the primitive society, as well as whether the latter can be understood in a Heideggerian or Object-Oriented 
manner. I will then develop a closer analysis of the relationship between Baudrillard and OOO specifically, 
considering the relations between the fourfold object and symbolic exchange, duomining and other points, 
towards the possibility of a revised understanding of Baudrillard and a discussion of whether an Object-
Oriented Baudrillard is possible, or even necessary. 
1   Baudrillard and handiness
Assessing the possible comparison between Heidegger and the philosophy of Baudrillard, the tool-
analysis employed by Heidegger’s Being and Time seems the most valuable place to start, having what 
Harman considers an “undeniably important place in Heidegger’s philosophy” and being arguably the 
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most important insight of Heidegger for OOO.1 It seems that such an analysis may unlock new perspectives 
upon both Heidegger and Baudrillard, but we should begin simply with a more descriptive outlook upon 
the two thinkers. We have at first two surface-level similarities between Heidegger’s understanding of the 
practical utility of the tool as always belonging to “a totality of useful things,” where “useful things always 
are in terms of their belonging to other useful things,” and Baudrillard’s theories of the system of objects 
and sign-exchange in his earlier philosophy.2 In The System of Objects Baudrillard writes that the analysis 
of a “‘spoken’ system of objects,” meaning the “more or less consistent system of meanings that objects 
institute,” must be founded on a “plane distinct from this ‘spoken’ system, a more strictly structured plane 
transcending even the functional account of objects.”3 For Baudrillard, this account is technological rather 
than strictly practical, and we will address this distinction more closely later, but for now it suffices to 
say that both thinkers consider the importance of the object existing in some kind of “system.” It emerges 
later in Baudrillard’s work that this system is essentially one which operates from a kind of unspoken 
general equivalency: that things are always “in terms of” other things, to use Heidegger’s phrasing. 
Exemplifying this thinking, in Symbolic Exchange and Death Baudrillard takes up Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
distinction between signified and signifier in understanding the role of the sign in language, but argues that 
“[r]eferential value is annihilated, giving the structural play of value the upper hand [emphasis removed],” 
meaning that the connotations between things, rather than what a thing denotes on its own, becomes what 
is most significant and autonomous.4 In this sense, for Baudrillard there also exists a kind of pre-existing 
backgrounded system, like how for Heidegger the “totality of useful things is always already discovered 
before the individual useful thing,” in a discovery which is not fully conscious but rather eminently 
practical.5 This kind of system of practical non-knowledge is in Heideggerian terms not “a knowledge of the 
useful character of the hammer” but rather a kind of “handiness [Zuhandenheit]” by which a thing “reveals 
itself by itself.”6 For Baudrillard we are also not generally in a position to know this backgrounded system 
and it also characterizes the majority of our everyday experience, or at least seems to. Yet, contrasted 
with Heidegger, it is critical for Baudrillard that this backgrounded system is not a kind of more primary 
relationship, or a revealing, but rather a kind of code which conceals the fact that reality has been replaced 
by a kind of hyperreality admitting no withdrawn origin, existing only on the surface. Thus, we should not 
be so quick to identify the system of tools in Heidegger with sign-exchange, or the role of the “code” for 
Baudrillard – the backgrounded system which guarantees the circulation of “signs that exchange among 
themselves” – but this should not deter us from exploring a deeper comparison between the thinkers and 
opens up an alternative approach which enriches both.7
The first step towards this other approach is found in considering the concept of withdrawal, which 
also plays a crucial part in OOO. Heidegger first hints at this idea by talking about how the tool, or system 
of tools, cannot be discovered through abstraction: for Heidegger, “[n]o matter how keenly we just look at 
the ‘outward appearance’ of things constituted in one way or another, we cannot discover handiness.”8 
Yet Heidegger also extends this by arguing that “[w]hat is peculiar to what is initially at hand is that it 
withdraws, so to speak, in its character of handiness in order to be really handy.”9 Whereas the OOO theorist 
might go even further, with Graham Harman proposing that “theory and praxis both live on the same side of 
the fence” in failing to grasp the reality of things, I believe a new comparison between Heidegger’s theory 
of handiness and Baudrillard’s theory of symbolic exchange should be opened up prior to considering its 
degree of similarity with OOO.10 Symbolic exchange is the mode of exchange found in primitive society, 
1 Harman, Speculative Realism, 93.
2 Heidegger, Being and Time, 68. 
3 Baudrillard, The System of Objects, 2-3. 
4 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, 28.  
5 Heidegger, Being and Time, 68. 
6 Ibid., 69. 
7 Baudrillard, Political Economy of the Sign, 147. 
8 Heidegger, Being and Time, 69. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Harman, Speculative Realism, 93.
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where things are not exchanged in terms of some general equivalent (as in sign-exchange), but rather in 
terms of a kind of functional act, which exhausts the ritual object and returns the excess to “nature.” We can 
see this exemplified in how Baudrillard views the “symbolic function” of primitive societies as “articulated 
not through the law of the Father […] but from the outset through a collective principle, through the 
collective movement of exchanges.”11 There is no pre-existing equivalent or schema under which things can 
continually exchange and shift without some element that withdraws, and any specific primitive exchange 
cannot be merely equivalent (identical) to another. This specificity mirrors Heidegger’s claim that in the 
practical role of his tool analysis, “the work to be produced is not just useful for…; production itself is always 
a using of something for something,” in other words, a specific function within which its sensual effects are 
exhausted with no remainder.12 An important exemplar of this can be found in the forms of symbolic gift-
exchange discussed by Marcel Mauss, and the specific outline of the value of this comparison for Heidegger 
and OOO will be addressed later. Lastly though, it is worth reinstating the prior analysis with the claim that 
this crucial comparison exists in terms of the analysis of withdrawal and the possibility of reading symbolic 
exchange as a kind of withdrawal, one where a thing is not exhausted by its sensual effects, but rather is 
withdrawn or “returns.” This builds on and challenges the initial possible comparison between the system 
of objects, sign-exchange and Heidegger’s handiness with a more sophisticated comparison with symbolic 
exchange. A closer analysis of this will be the primary focus of the next few sections and will allow us to 
develop the speculative outlines of a possible Object-Oriented Baudrillard. 
2  Baudrillard and withdrawal
One element that is critical to Heidegger’s tool-analysis is the idea that to discover a presence, i.e. to 
incorporate it into our knowledge, is in some sense to lose the thing. For Heidegger, when we find nature 
“in its mere objective presence [Vorhandenheit]” we miss the dimension that “stirs and strives,” that which 
“overcomes us, entrances us as landscape, remains hidden.”13 An analysis like this draws obvious parallels 
with Baudrillard’s criticisms of the flattening of discourse into a kind of abstract “rationality” which 
assumes everything to be fundamentally knowable in some way. It’s along these lines that Baudrillard 
critiques a project which he sees as the attempt to “liquidate the given world. To destroy it by substituting 
an artificial one, built from scratch, a world for which we do not have to account to anyone.”14 It seems 
that such a criticism is directed at attempts to account for a world fully constructed and subsumed by 
ourselves and our scientific categories, ones which we have formed and which, at least without nuance, 
seek to reduce everything to some fundamental layer totally distinct from the “given” world of unabstracted 
practice that Heidegger talks of. This act of “[m]easuring the world by the Human” is exactly the kind of 
anthropocentric hubris that OOO aims to critique and is thus a first line of connection between Baudrillard 
and these anti-anthropocentric philosophers, mirroring that of Heidegger’s own claim that “the river’s 
‘source’ ascertained by the geographer is not the ‘source in the ground’.”15 However, we should not leave 
Heidegger behind just yet. One other key line of comparison between Baudrillard and Heidegger can be 
found in their respective understandings of the essence of technology, something for which both writers are 
to some degree infamous. Heidegger’s important work, The Question Concerning Technology can be shown 
to be of significant value for interpreting Baudrillard and will also, when interpreted through Baudrillard’s 
philosophy, shed some new light on the relationship between OOO and Heidegger. 
11 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, 156. 
12 Heidegger, Being and Time, 70.
13 Ibid. 
14 Baudrillard, Impossible Exchange, 17.
15 Ibid., 20; Heidegger, Being and Time, 70.
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3  The question concerning technology
Heidegger diagnoses that the essence of technology is distinct from its understood functioning, suggesting 
that “in order to be correct, this fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in question in its essence.”16 
Rather, beyond its mere definition as both “means to an end” and “human activity,” technology is something 
which goes beyond and hints at something that withdraws.17 The essence of technology is thus a “bringing-
forth” which “brings hither out of concealment forth into unconcealment,” in a process which is “grounded 
in revealing.”18 Such a process should lead to the unconcealment of certain truths about an object, perhaps, 
as OOO might diagnose it, in terms of its withdrawal from direct epistemological access, or from its sensual 
qualities. However, Heidegger suggests that with the modern form of technology, although it is still a form 
of revealing, its essence of revealing shifts radically towards a new mode. He writes that this “revealing 
that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable 
demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such,” and this claim towards the essential 
role of the “standing-reserve [Bestand]” for Heidegger’s diagnosis of modern technology can be usefully 
reinterpreted through the philosophy of Jean Baudrillard, and one of his predecessors, Georges Bataille.19 
In a significant section which clearly highlights how Heidegger interprets this difference, he sees how the 
peasant, who may use certain technologies, although they may be somewhat primitive, “does not challenge 
the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and 
watches over its increase,” something which he believes that the essence of modern technology encourages 
us to neglect.20 It seems most useful to understand this traditional form of technology as grounded in an 
act of not only bringing-forth (revealing), of the possibility of change and new growth, but also as an act of 
withdrawal: a return to the “keeping of the forces of growth.” The soil of the field is thus revealed by sowing 
the seed, but in another sense withdraws. In doing so, one certainly does not “challenge” it by hoping to 
make the soil fully on the surface such that it can be “stored” by us without any return or reinvestment in 
that which exceeds our powers, and a parallel conceptions of this kind of objection to the contemporary age 
are addressed by Georges Bataille in The Accursed Share Vol.1. 
For Bataille, whose work on the concept of the accursed share is a significant influence for Baudrillard, 
if there is some part of our consumed standing-reserve (accursed share) that “is doomed to destruction 
or at least to unproductive use without any possible profit, it is logical, even inescapable, to surrender 
commodities without return.”21 To avoid confusion, I suggest that we should certainly not take “profit” in its 
reductive sense of the restricted economy, but in Bataille’s understanding of economy as general economy, 
a kind of productive organic growth, or development of new potentiality. Equally, “without return” should, 
it seems, be understood in the sense that what is not used cannot be returned to an immediately accessible 
standing-reserve, but must instead be entirely withdrawn (by exhausting its sensual dimension) in a similar 
way to how the watch of the seed is withdrawn to a real “nature,” existing behind and separate from an 
object’s standing-reserve. The object is thus never fully at our disposal and, although there is perhaps a 
moral dimension implied here, there is also a degree of philosophical wisdom in assenting to the idea that 
something always withdraws from our understanding and practice. This piece of wisdom plays a critical 
role for both OOO and, as I will elaborate, for Baudrillard as well. Returning then to the earlier remark on 
Mauss, our next step should be to develop an account of symbolic gift-exchange as a theory of withdrawal 
and find our entry point into an account of a possible Object-Oriented Baudrillard. 
16 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 6.
17 Ibid., 4. 
18 Ibid., 11, 12. 
19 Ibid., 14, 17. 
20 Ibid., 15.
21 Bataille, The Accursed Share: Volume 1, 25. 
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4  Withdrawal and symbolic exchange
It seems, then, that we might be able to interpret Baudrillard’s notion of sign-exchange in a new light 
through this concept of the standing-reserve and via a comparison with Heidegger’s analysis of the 
essence of technology. One last critical dimension of this theory is his concept of Enframing, which marks 
how “unconcealment comes to pass in conformity with which the work of modern technology reveals 
the real as standing-reserve,” hence something both there to be known, but also alienated from us and 
ungrounded.22 Just as how sign-exchange marks the disappearance of the object of reference into the play 
of signifiers, Heidegger’s standing-reserve marks the condition where “even the object disappears into the 
objectlessness.”23 Yet it is also within this same work that we see the emerging line of comparison between 
the withdrawal of the object in the truth-process, the “revealing” of traditional technology, and the notion 
of symbolic exchange for Baudrillard. The best exemplar of the logic of symbolic exchange, as hinted 
earlier, is likely to be found in Mauss’s great sociological study of gift-exchange from The Gift. For Mauss, 
this principle of the gift-exchange must have been that of societies that have gone beyond the phase of ‘total services’ (from 
clan to clan, and from family to family) but have not yet reached that of purely individual contract, of the market where 
money circulates, of sale proper, and above all of the notion of price reckoned in coinage weighed and stamped with its 
value.24
Here it becomes apparent that exchange takes place not in the form of “total services,” where everything is 
conducted merely as one single mass exchange, but also not in an exchange against a general equivalent, 
where “money circulates” and everything is exchanged within and against a presumed standing-reserve. 
We are thus between perhaps the most hierarchical and the most modern forms of exchange with a form 
which neither ignores the role of the specific individual object (gift) by reducing it to a standing-reserve of 
other gifts (its relation in a flattened network of actants), nor to a singular point of focus, such as the total 
exchange of various pieces between clan leaders only. The gift object itself therefore cannot be reduced 
or exhausted merely in its original function, which is just to be given, since it also carries with it a kind 
of obligation for it to be returned (although this is never made explicit as an object for epistemological 
awareness). In the specific object employed for its specific function, and symbolizing a certain gesture (with 
a set of sensual effects) there is always something which withdraws, and must be returned without being 
exhausted – without making all of it available as standing-reserve. 
This gift-exchange should not be taken to exhaust the possibilities of symbolic exchange, which indeed 
may have an even more general form in turn as well, but is perhaps the best way of exemplifying it in a 
practical context. It is, in a sense, a specific technology of symbolic exchange, where the central premise 
is merely that there is always a reciprocal (dual) relation between the gift given and the gift received: one 
which is never symmetrical. Harman’s OOO makes a similar point, emphasizing the view that with the 
tension between an object and its qualities (and also between the sensual and the real) one should not 
presume that these relations are always symmetrical. In metaphor, for example, it is not the case that 
the object is identical to its qualities, and thus also not true that a symmetrical literalism is valid. To use 
Harman’s example, the “metaphorical object is a cypress with flame-qualities,” but it would be false to 
assume that this entails a symmetrical object of a “flame with cypress-qualities.”25 This kind of equivalency 
is criticized by Baudrillard as well, since it would become the presencing of everything in terms of a general 
equivalent, such as money, sign-exchange etc., when for Baudrillard, and arguably for Mauss, the symbolic 
relation cannot be exchanged for anything else, and is thus uni-directional and asymmetrical. This aspect 
of symbolic exchange plays a critical role in constituting the possibility of a meaningful practice beyond 
the code for Baudrillard, but perhaps more interestingly for our purposes, it offers a new line of comparison 
between Baudrillard and OOO. 
22 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 21. 
23 Ibid., 19.
24 Mauss, The Gift, 59 [all emphases removed].
25 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 75.
80   M.J. King
Before outlining a more precise speculative theory of an Object-Oriented gift-exchange, inspired by the 
prior analysis, it is worth briefly summarizing some of the important tenants of OOO which are relevant 
to such an enquiry. For the purposes of simplicity, I have favored Graham Harman’s interpretation of the 
theory, which can be appropriately captured in the idea, briefly raised earlier, that there are a number of 
tensions both between an object and its qualities and between what is called sensual and what is called 
real. These tensions give us a fourfold structure, composed of real objects, sensual objects, real qualities 
and sensual qualities. The real object is that which can be compared to this “withdrawn” object we have 
talked about above, which is for Harman (borrowing from José Ortega y Gasset) a reference to “the executant 
reality of things in their own right.”26 Sensual objects, conversely, are ones for which there is no inwardness, 
since they “are nothing more than correlates of our experience.”27 These are comparable to the role of the 
object (signified) in sign-exchange for Baudrillard, although this is perhaps only the case when we mistake 
the sensual object for the real (withdrawn) one, which is the condition when we take the sensual object as 
a real object existing for us exhaustively in the standing-reserve of the code. Any object must have certain 
qualities, and the sensual qualities are the qualities a sensual object appears to have at any given moment, 
although these may shift around as the object is extended through time. Real qualities, conversely, are 
qualities which an object must necessarily have. Between this fourfold there are, as stated before, a number 
of different tensions (ten to be exact, four between objects and qualities, three between qualities and three 
between objects) but we should only see which tensions are most relevant for our enquiry here. I would like 
to suggest that the most important tension for Baudrillard is the tension between real object and sensual 
object since this, I maintain, is what can be held to characterize Baudrillard and Mauss’s understanding of 
the gift, and hence symbolic exchange more broadly. 
To demonstrate this proposal, we should begin by recognizing that the gift given is a real object, but 
it is also one which is never exhausted in the act of giving (it always withdraws), and it is this which gives 
it its power of obligation. The gift received is thus a sensual object in one respect (it is this sensual object 
with these various real and sensual qualities), and in this sense Harman is right that “[t]he real object that I 
myself am is directly confronted by sensual objects,” but also, in another respect, I must be aware that this 
excessive gift cannot be held in standing-reserve forever.28 The sensual object must be spent, exhausted and 
returned according to Bataille’s principle of expenditure. I am thus aware that the sensual object does not 
exhaust the real one that withdraws, and that to preserve its magic I must preserve its illusion, that is, I must 
preserve the fact that the sensual object is a façade and not assume that I have a direct access or knowledge 
of it. In doing so, I return the object, rather than leave it in standing-reserve, by expending its sensual 
façade and accepting its withdrawal from me. The first gift-giver is now given, by the first gift-receiver, a 
new sensual object (gift) in their return of the real object which withdraws. This exchange can continue ad 
infinitum, theoretically, since the gift-receiver must never hold onto the sensual object entirely as standing-
reserve (which is not to take it as a sensual object, but to take it mistakenly as a real one), meaning that 
the withdrawn real object can continually give sensual facades or illusion, as Baudrillard terms it, without 
ever being claimed to be exhausted.29 It is when we mistake the sensual object for the real one, where it 
becomes merely standing-reserve for us, that we abandon illusion and fall into the precession of simulacra, 
and to the hyperreality of the present condition. This trap is the presumption that we, as real objects, can 
directly interact with and have knowledge of the other real objects – to make the assumption that there is 
no distinction between real and sensual object. The best way of understanding how one may avoid such a 




29 Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, 65. 
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5  Baudrillard and duomining
For any Object-Oriented Ontologist the major threat is the obliteration or reduction of an object to something 
else, essentially to something that is knowable. For Harman there are two different techniques for explaining 
what something is, the first being a tactic to undermine it, “replacing a thing with its causal, material, or 
compositional elements,” and the second a tactic of overmining, by reducing “things to their impact on us 
or on each other.”30 In either case one seems to miss the object itself, something which we’ve already seen to 
be significant. Instead, again, everything is reduced to that which is knowable and the objects of knowledge 
are always accessible in standing-reserve. This is particularly potent in the tendency of duomining, which 
is effectively the combination of both strategies simultaneously, giving two distinct forms of image whilst 
eliminating the object which withdraws from them. For Baudrillard, it seems particularly obvious that 
undermining is a concern although, as will be made clear, this becomes intimately interconnected in its 
functioning alongside overmining as well. 
Both Baudrillard and Heidegger have a deep skepticism towards science, or, if we are to be a bit more 
charitable, at least towards scientism. For Baudrillard that which is “other, the object, disappears on the 
horizons of science,” which bears a clear resemblance to the idea that science at its most extreme often tends 
towards reductivist notions of a complete theory of everything, which posits any object as hypothetically 
knowable in a way which is normally characterized by undermining things to their basic parts, establishing 
some kind of explicit material basis to which the properties of more complex forms can be reduced.31 This 
argument against excessive scientism was already present in Heidegger’s critique of how contemporary 
“science’s way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces,” missing 
the critical role of the withdrawn and backgrounded “nature,” having an importance for Heidegger which 
has already been well established in the earlier section on technology.32 This insight is certainly shared by 
Harman as well, who sees aesthetics as the root of all philosophy, and not science or scientific methodology, 
which to some degree presupposes a direct access to the workings of things themselves (at least as currently 
practiced).33 
Conversely, however, we should not assume that Baudrillard is a theorist of overmining either, 
since although the surface effects of things play such a crucial and fascinating role for his critique of the 
contemporary, there is, at least in his earlier works, a clear sense of the importance of withdrawal, as 
demonstrated earlier in the comparative sections with Heidegger. Thus, we need to be a little critical of 
Harman’s argument that “Baudrillard belongs in roughly the same camp as Husserl. With his career-long 
emphasis on simulation and simulacra, Baudrillard is the very opposite of a traditional realist, and he closes 
off the realm of withdrawn substance at least as much as Husserl does,” for two mistakes, or at least points 
of omission which are not adequately raised.34 Firstly, his interest in simulation and simulacra is not quite 
career-long and it omits some of his earliest work on the system of objects, the structural critique of Marx, 
symbolic exchange and so on, and secondly, as raised throughout this essay, by missing this dimension 
we do not begin to see the importance of precisely why Baudrillard “closes off the realm of withdrawn 
substance.”35 Even in some of his more pessimistic work, which did preoccupy a considerable amount of 
his career, such as the more nihilistic Fatal Strategies (1990), we see the significance of the object contra 
the commodity. Whereas the commodity is “readable,” the object “never confesses completely its secret.”36 
Thus, it seems that his notion of the revenge of the object, “the fatal reversibility of the object” which 
“lies in wait for us,” is something which is best understood not only alongside his later works, but also 
in conjunction with his earlier works and particularly with the concept of symbolic exchange, something 
which, as suggested in our readings of Heidegger and the gift, brings Baudrillard much closer to Heidegger 
30 Harman, Speculative Realism, 92; Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 49.
31 Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, 85. 
32 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 21.
33 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 61-102.
34 Harman, “Object-Oriented Seduction,” 130. 
35 See Baudrillard, The System of Objects, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign and other texts. 
36 Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, 67. 
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than Harman suspected.37 In this sense Baudrillard, although he recognizes the contemporary prevalence 
of overmining, and to some degree immerses himself in its dizzying majesty, should not be assumed to 
be completely neglectful of the “withdrawn substance,” even if he does suggest that our recognition of it 
becomes irrecoverable within this contemporary moment. 
Interestingly, then, Baudrillard is probably best understood as an early critic of the tendency of 
duomining, despite often indulging in this himself, through his recognition of how reducing things to the 
dizzying surface, whilst at the same time pursuing a scientism which reduces things to their basic parts, 
sees the object (and the subject with it as well) become completely lost. In the tendency to over-extend our 
subjective capabilities and power, using modern technology to “challenge” everything into the standing-
reserve of possible knowledge, we set the conditions instead for the very opposite tendency, where “all 
initiative and power are on the other side, the side of the object.”38 This paradox is best explained by the 
notion that in this project to make everything available in standing-reserve, we begin to reduce ourselves 
merely to the level of something to be known, and commit the error of alienating ourselves towards the 
same two duomined images to which we reduce everything else. It is therefore, conversely to what might 
be expected, that the hidden withdrawnness of objects has its last revenge, as the “subject of analysis has 
become fragile everywhere and this revenge of the object has only just begun.”39 This is best illustrated by 
the example of the increasing threat of climate change and other ecological catastrophes which emerge 
on the horizon even when we are at our most dominant conceptually: where the very emergent conditions 
of the Anthropocene also mark a degree of human helplessness against the objects it tried to exhaustively 
understand and control. In this light, we now have the possibility of reading Baudrillard as increasingly a 
thinker of an object-oriented tendency. Yet, contra Harman, Baudrillard was often keen to denigrate the 
role of art and aesthetics, and this may serve as an argument against seeing him as object-oriented thinker, 
given the crucial role art has for OOO. I propose that Baudrillard was to some degree mistaken, or at least 
too critical, in his understanding of art’s functional purpose, and before addressing the question of whether 
he is fully compatible with OOO, it would first be useful to highlight why Harman and Ortega’s theory of 
aesthetics offers a useful counter-argument against Baudrillard, and how this point may allow us to revise 
his account.
6  Aesthetics and withdrawal
Probably the clearest and most concise elucidation of Baudrillard’s views on art are contained in his book 
The Intelligence of Evil, which was one of his last books and well after the pessimistic turn of his thought. 
For Baudrillard, what he calls the “conspiracy” of art can be found in the “complicity that art forges with 
itself, its collusion with the real, through which it becomes complicit in that Integral Reality.”40 To dissect 
this we should define more clearly the notion of “Integral Reality” and then consider what Baudrillard’s 
sense of “the real” is here, and how the real for Baudrillard differs from the withdrawn “reality” of OOO. 
Integral Reality, in Baudrillard’s words, marks the contemporary condition where “everything becomes 
real, everything becomes visible and transparent, everything is ‘liberated’, everything comes to fruition and 
has a meaning.”41 It is essentially the condition where, after the death of God, “we have found ourselves 
confronted with the undertaking of realizing the world,” and this is perhaps clearest in the Enlightenment-
style project of establishing an all-encompassing knowledge which can be characterized by the duomining 
tactic we have just been critiquing.42 Unlike Harman, Baudrillard holds that art is essentially complicit with 
this contemporary duomining, and the Heideggerian notion of holding everything in standing-reserve. Yet 




40 Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil, 83.  
41 Ibid., 13.
42 Ibid. 
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following Ortega, he takes to be the paradigm case of the logic of the aesthetic, as the root of all philosophy 
and the method to reintroduce the critical importance of things-in-themselves in a non-ethical sense.43 It is 
thus worth addressing in further detail why these two views are so distinct in order to understand whether 
they are reconcilable or if one or both accounts require revision.  
Contra Harman, Baudrillard sees art as essentially representational and concerned with the attempt 
to represent something. The problem with this for Baudrillard, and why it becomes “complicit,” is that 
in our dizzying and intimately interconnected world, it has become the case that “art invaded the whole 
field of reality” and thus that it has nothing to represent but itself: “Art is quite simply what is at issue in 
the world of art.”44 Baudrillard never explicitly employs the same ontology as OOO and it thereby seems 
that Baudrillard understands the aesthetic not in terms of a conscious hinting at what withdraws, or as an 
active theatricality, but rather as something which is merely complicit with “the real” which for Baudrillard 
is always already the hyperreal – the seamless and smooth exchange of sensual qualities which marks 
the postmodern condition. On the other hand, what Harman offers us is an understanding of art that is 
not inherently or necessarily representative, since it strictly cannot represent something which withdraws, 
other than in the sense that it stands in for it, but also hints at a beyond. It is this beyond which is gestured 
at that Baudrillard doesn’t recognize in art, yet for Harman art is almost always a productive endeavor: the 
creation of a new compound object, where the beholder as real object “creates its own object in the very 
act of believing [emphasis removed]” in the metaphor, i.e. believing that the metaphor can stand in for 
the real object in some sense, but without exhausting it.45 For Harman then, contra Baudrillard, art can 
still generate difference and the new, since the compound object is a new object, one which is not merely 
an orgy of difference given that it hints at and points towards the closure of something beyond itself – 
the object that withdraws. If OOO are right, we can take Baudrillard’s criticism of representational and 
self-representational art without accepting that the whole aesthetic project is already dead. Baudrillard 
is thus also still partially right to argue that art “in its form, signifies nothing. It is merely a sign pointing 
towards absence,” since it quite literally points towards something which is absent in the sensual, namely 
an object which withdraws.46 Yet, also, Baudrillard is to some degree wrong, since he assumes that art has 
nothing beyond its value in sign-exchange, the market and commodity value of “art,” something which 
Harman’s understanding of the aesthetic metaphor and real object/ sensual quality tension makes clear. If 
Baudrillard were to accept that such a characterization of art was possible, it would open up a whole new 
line of comparison between him and OOO. I hope to have demonstrated at least a few reasons why such a 
characterization might not be strictly contradictory. For now, though, we should consider, assuming that 
such a comparison holds, whether we can go so far as to posit an Object-Oriented Baudrillard and address 
in detail what such a proposal would entail. 
7  Towards an Object-Oriented Baudrillard?
One key distinguishing factor between Baudrillard and OOO is that whilst for Bataille, Baudrillard and 
seemingly for Heidegger as well, at least as hinted at in parts of the tool-analysis and The Question 
Concerning Technology discussed before, what can be said to withdraw is some kind of unspecified (or 
unspecifiable) “nature”, this is not necessarily one that proclaims the individual and independent nature 
of every object in doing so. This claim is central for OOO in Harman’s proposition that a tool can break, but 
that it “could not break if it were nothing more than its functional relations to all other beings” and hence 
that there must be some “stubborn surface” beneath every object.”47 It seems, conversely, that thinkers like 
Bataille and Baudrillard hold that what withdraws is another possible organization or exchange beyond 
every existing one: beyond every Enframing there is some nature, force, materiality which withdraws and 
43 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 69. 
44 Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil, 84. 
45 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 181. 
46 Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil, 86. 
47 Harman, Speculative Realism, 94. 
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is not exhausted in what it “gives” (gifts). This recognition keeps the notion of finitude but to some degree 
leaves open the possibility that objects are not actually totally independent, but only independent with 
regard to any framing of them. That a tool can break in the frame would simply then be to reveal that 
the frame, indeed any framing process, is inadequate: being is always a call beyond any particular frame, 
a hinting at something that withdraws. For Baudrillard this is best captured by his proposal that since 
humans “have put an end to this dual relation with the sun,” we can no longer understand or even conceive 
of the idea that something withdraws from the frame, since there is no “dual, antagonistic exchange” when 
everything is held in standing-reserve.48  We thus lose the call of being and in turn face our becoming-object 
in the sense of which the object is merely the sensual standing-reserve which is in itself nothing. There is 
then at least some suggestion of a realist ontology in Baudrillard, but the question remains as to whether 
or not one is impelled to accept OOO’s specific variation even if we assented to the various premises of 
Heidegger or Baudrillard. The debate on OOO’s interpretation of Heidegger is already well established, but 
given that Baudrillard is a distinct thinker in his own right, we should consider whether this opens up new 
lines of approach. 
Returning to aspects of Baudrillard’s philosophy then, we see at least one indication that his philosophy 
might be open to an OOO interpretation in the gift-exchange discussed previously. For this and any other 
form of symbolic exchange, it is always this specific gift that is exchanged and not another, reflecting 
Baudrillard’s central proposition that symbolic exchange is irreducible to sign-exchange and its principle of 
equivalency. It seems, then, that Baudrillard accepts the specificity of the symbolically exchanged sensual 
object and its non-identity to its merely sensual qualities (at least in the primitive society) since it is not the 
sensual qualities, which are for Baudrillard merely the inessential connotations or play of signifiers which 
make the specific object itself (its denotation) arbitrary, which exhaust this object. Having rejected the 
Humean bundle theory view, Baudrillard was, in his view of primitive exchange, committed to a sensual 
object and sensual quality split. He was also, as we have demonstrated, committed to a real object, taken 
at this point merely as something that withdraws in order to retain the “illusion” and not hold everything 
in standing-reverse. Yet, as we know, there can be no object without qualities, so the real object must also, 
presumably, have qualities – there are thus at least some real qualities essential to the real object, and we 
can assume at least some of these are present in the sensual object. Given the range of sensual qualities 
attached to various sensual objects, we can also then presume that these objects do not share the same 
real qualities. Some of these real qualities will contradict, and thus we have good reason to presume that 
there may not be a single real withdrawn object, materiality, force etc. that can account for them. Such a 
view would give good credence to the account that Baudrillard’s symbolic exchange would encourage an 
acceptance of an Object-Oriented metaphysics. However, this does not constitute a strict proof. One major 
reservation is that we have already granted that what is withdrawn is an “object,” thereby to some degree 
projecting our understanding of objecthood onto it, giving us the presupposition that this is something 
which has irreconcilable real qualities and must therefore be a variety of real and totally independent 
objects. It seems conceivable, conversely, that some other kind of ontology might be able to explain the 
same sensually conceived phenomena, such as Iain Hamilton Grant’s view of a withdrawn “productive 
force that generates individual bodies as a derivative byproduct.”49 We, emerging within the process, would 
have no conscious access to the force in its totalized sense, but only the view of its production of bodies at 
a certain scale, and the same would be true in a parallel sense with other bodies. Hypothetically, one could 
also explain the “challenge” technology puts to nature by reducing this force to its acts on a certain scale, 
or to specific bodies which are produced, thus alienating us from a real process which seems to withdraw. 
Whether or not such a comparison holds beyond this very preliminary suggestion is far beyond our scope 
here, but nevertheless the criticism seems to hold. 
What we have then, is at least one frame of understanding by which we could grasp and reinterpret 
Baudrillard as an object-oriented thinker, as well as a number of useful lines of comparison between Harman 
and Baudrillard’s thought. It seems that Baudrillard’s symbolic exchange constitutes an interesting and 
48 Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil, 148. 
49 Harman, Speculative Realism, 63. 
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new way to conceive of some of the tensions in OOO, and to reconceive of the relationship with Heidegger 
through a non-standard emphasis on certain parts of The Question Concerning Technology. Alongside 
this, we have a clearer picture of the role of aesthetics for OOO and Baudrillard, as well as a new way of 
approaching and conceiving the problem of duomining through Baudrillard’s philosophy. That we cannot 
show Baudrillard as necessarily an OOO thinker is thus not so much a loss, but instead opens up new lines 
of potential thought which might otherwise have remained closed. 
8  Conclusion
By considering a broader range of texts, we have been able to demonstrate the irreducibility of Baudrillard 
to a kind of Husserl-style reading attempted at least to some degree by Harman and in doing so discovered 
that there are new lines of comparison to be found between Baudrillard, Heidegger and Harman in ways 
which enrich all three. We have seen that symbolic gift-exchange can be modelled in a way which is 
compatible with OOO and offers an interesting way of conceiving the withdrawn object. Alongside this, 
we have seen the critical importance of avoiding the tendency to duomine objects entirely, by presuming 
that everything could hypothetically come under the purview of our knowledge, or be accessible by our 
practice. In demonstrating the possibility of an object-oriented Baudrillard we have also shown, however, 
that this is not the only plausible ontology for such a position, and it would be valuable to explore in greater 
depth whether or not his symbolic exchange is compatible with other metaphysical systems. It would also 
be useful to have a more exact picture of where Baudrillard and Heidegger disagree, given that our focus 
here has been primarily on possible lines of convergence between the two. To conclude then, we may ask, 
in the ironic spirit of Baudrillard himself: there are many sensual Baudrillards, but who or what is the real 
Baudrillard that withdraws? 
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